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I. Introduction
Congress, through section 629 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, has instructed the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") to "adopt regulations to assure the commercial availability
of equipment used to access multichannel video programming and
other services offered over multichannel video programming
systems.' In particular, Congress would like the FCC to investigate
the thriving retail market for such navigation devices (or set-top
boxes). As such, the FCC must continue to look at the market for
* Matthew A. Eller, Esq. is a solo practitioner specializing in Intellectual Property law
living and working in Brooklyn, New York (Twitter @ellerlawfirm). Matthew has
received an LL.M. in Intellectual Property law from Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
and a J.D. from California Western School of Law. Before practicing law Matthew spent
almost ten years working in the music industry and additionally achieved a M.A. in
Musicology from New York University focusing on electronic music history and its impact
on popular culture. Matthew's Brooklyn-based practice features a roster of clients from
the world(s) of urban/graffiti art, music, photography, and Mixed Martial Arts/Brazilian
Jiu-Jitsu practitioners. Matthew would like to thank his family (Dad, Mom, Sabra, Brent,
Caitlin, Mugsy.. .), Prof. Brett Frischmann, Prof. Susan Crawford, Prof. David Nimmer,
Robert Schwartz, and Kiran Patel.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 549 (1996).
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navigation devices to see if the marketplace truly exists; if it is not
thriving, the FCC must continue to make changes to foster such a
market.
Former FCC Commissioner Susan Ness eloquently expressed the
importance of section 629, and its probable impact by saying:
Digital set top devices are likely to be the gateway between
digital bitstreams and new applications that may reside in the
intelligent appliances of the future. These devices not only will
control television service, but are likely to be the customer's
gateway to the Internet and the world of electronic commerce.
Thus, the directive of [s]ection 629 of the Communications
Act that our rules enable the commercial availability of these
devices has potential consequences well beyond the provision
of multichannel video.2
It is for these reasons, and many others which shall be discussed
throughout this article, that section 629 has the potential to not only
create legislation that can benefit all consumers in relation to their
set-top boxes, but also outline the FCC's true ancillary jurisdictional
power.
The basic idea behind section 629 is that for a consumer to have a
fairly priced and reliable multichannel video programming
distributors ("MVPDs"), there must be industry-wide universal
standards as to content availability and security in intellectual
property rights.! Some suppose that section 629 will thrive under such
a regime and achieve its stated goals, while others believe that
industry-wide standards will actually stifle innovation and that the
objectives of section 629 can be achieved more efficiently without
such regulations.!
This article will examine the turbulent history of section 629 of the
Telecommunications Act, including its adoption and amendments, its
claims as to "plug & play" devices, and the effects of the recent
2. Susan Ness, FCC Commissioner, Separate Statement: Commercial Availability of
Navigation Devices Order on Reconsideration (May 13, 1999), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Speeches/Ness/States/stsn911.btml.
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 549 (1996).
4. See Todd Spangler, Tech Giants Reissue Cry for "AllVid, " MULTICHANNEL NEWS
(Aug. 13, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.multichannel.com/node/108080 for a discussion in
favor of industry-wide standards; but see Matthew Lasar, Google, Best Buy, and Sony Ally
Against Big Cable, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 18, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/
2011/02/google-best-buy-and-sony-ally-against-big-cable/ for a discussion against industry-
wide standards.
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EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FFC6 holding. This article will begin with a
brief history of section 629 and its proposed purpose, then discuss the
industry's first attempt at industry-wide standards-first with
CableCARD technology, then its successor, AllVid technology. This
article will then analyze the purpose and history of the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction, the holding in the newly decided EchoStar Satellite LLC v.
FCC, and the possible future consequences of the Echostar decision as
to other pending cases in the DC Circuit.
H. Section 624A of the Telecommunications Act
In a 1991 senate hearing, Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democrat
representing Vermont, articulated a story about his mother. Senator
Leahy's mother had been unable to use her picture-in-picture on her
television due to "unnecessary cable practices."' Accordingly, this
scenario brought the Senator to realize that consumers, because of
the state of the cable boxes they were using, were prevented from
viewing one channel while simultaneously recording another.! This
led the Senator to make "threats" in the form of legislation to remedy
this problem-both for his mother, and for the cable-viewing public
at large.9
As relatable as Senator Leahy's story about his mother may have
been, rumor had it his staff was also frustrated when they realized
that a cable box prevented them from using a television's picture-in-
picture feature to watch the World Series while monitoring the
Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearing.o
Nevertheless, the concern did lead to legislation which specifically
addressed the "Senator Leahy" problem. It entailed in part that
features such as picture-in-picture should be easier to use, and that
one could not simultaneously record a channel while watching
another."
Section 624A was designed to promote the competitive
availability of converter device products and remote controls, and
12facilitate the combined use of converters and TVs. In 1996, section
5. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FFC, 704 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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624A was supplemented by the more comprehensive section 304 of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which is section 629 of the
Telecommunications Act." Section 629(a) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1934, as amended, requires the FCC to:
[A]dopt regulations to assure the commercial availability, to
consumers of multichannel video programming and other
services offered over multichannel video programming systems,
of converter boxes, interactive communications equipment, and
other equipment used by consumers to access multichannel
video programming and other services offered over
multichannel video programming systems, from manufacturers,
retailers, and other vendors not affiliated with any multichannel
video programming distributor.14
The policy behind section 629 was to create a secondary market
allowing consumers the option of purchasing navigation devices from
sources other than their MVPD, by ensuring that cable systems
supported such equipment." In practice, this would ideally mean that
the consumer could go to the local Best Buy and purchase a set-top
box that could simply be plugged into a coaxial cable, and the box
would automatically be compatible with any MVPD."
The essential guidelines set out in section 629 required that the
governed MVPDs include: television, multichannel broadcast
television, direct broadcast satellite ("DBS"), multichannel
multipoint distribution service ("MMDS"), and satellite master
antenna television ("SMATV")." Subscribers could attach any
compatible navigation device to a multichannel video programming
system.18 As such, MVPDs were prohibited from taking any action
which would hinder access or functionality from being available to
13. 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1996).
14. Id.
15. Michael Wolf, Is AllVid the Lynchpin to Google TV Dominion?, GIGAOM
RESEARCH (Feb. 11, 2011), http://research.gigaom.com/2011/02/is-allvid-the-lynchpin-to-
google-tv-domination/.
16. Larry Spivak, More Observations from CES..., @LAWANDECONOMICS BLOG (Jan.
19,2012), http://phoenix-center.org/blog/archives/199.
17. Press Release, FCC, Commission Adopts "Navigation Devices" Rules Creating
Consumer Market for Set Top Boxes and Other Equipment Used With Video
Programming Systems (June 11, 1998), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/
NewsReleases/1998/nrcb8Ol3.html.
18. Id.
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manufacturers, retailers, or other unaffiliated third parties."
However, MVPDs were allowed to take necessary steps to assure the
security of their systems and programming, including the
unauthorized reception of service. 20 These are just some of the
pertinent guidelines expressed in section 629, which the FCC
believed-if adhered to in good faith-would "result in a broad
expansion of the market for navigation devices so that they become
commercially available through retail stores ... create incentive for
innovation, choice, and better price" for the consumer.
Although this idea of a universal set-top box may seem at first
glance to be a viable possibility for the FCC to oversee, many
significant hurdles stand in the way of its reality, including copyright
issues, security concerns, and diversity in network design technology.22
A. CableCARD: The Adventure Begins
The FCC's inquiry into the implementation of section 629 started
with CableCARD, an interface for digital television which (ideally)
let consumers plug their cable line directly into their television set
without the need for a set-top box, allowing them to view otherwise
encrypted video.7
The original CableCARD rules went into effect as part of the
implementation of section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
The FCC's stated goal in this first Report and Order was to provide
customers with the option of purchasing the retail set-top box instead
of paying to rent one from one of the MVPD providers.24 As a security
device, CableCARD as provided by the MVPD could be installed into
a customer's retail device to allow the customer to watch the MVPD's
programming."
However, since the first Report and Order, the number of
customers who have taken advantage of the opportunity to purchase





23. FAQ: CableCARD? What's That?, CNET NEWS (Jan. 20, 2005),
http://news.cnet.com/FAQ-CableCARD-Whats-that/2100-1041_3-5542400.html.
24. In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13
FCC Rcd. 14775 (1998).
25. Corey Malmgren, Selected FCC Docket Summaries, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECrUS
277 (2010).
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CableCARD into their personal set-top box, has been minimal.26
According to the Commission, only one percent of navigation devices
deployed were purchased from a retailer-the remaining were rented
from MVPDs.2
B. CableCARD; Great in Theory, Tough in Practice
The lingering question at this time was if CableCARD had the
ability to foster the FCCs goals mandated by section 629, then what
went wrong?
One of the early problems that consumers found to be a deterrent
was the CableCARD's huge limitations. In particular, the early
CableCARDs supported only one-way access, which meant that
consumers could not enjoy program guides, video-on-demand, or use
of a DVR.2 8 In addition, the device did not gain much support from
the MVPDs, who were dragging their feet as to supporting the new
technology. 29 The MVPDs believed that the CableCARD technology
"conflict[ed] with cable's own market imperatives," and argued that
the industry "simply ha[d] no economic incentive" to support these
third-party boxes.30
To combat these roadblocks, in 1988 the FCC enacted an
"integration ban" requirement, which stated that leased set-top boxes
would have to include CableCARDs in order to facilitate the
deployment of downloadable security options." The "integration ban"
established a date after which cable operators could no longer place
into service new navigation devices, such as set-top boxes, that
performed both conditional access and other functions in a single
integrated device without CableCARD integration.32 The purpose of
the ban was to guarantee reliance by both cable operators and
consumer electronics manufacturers on a common, separated security
26. Id.
27. Jeff Gee, FCC Re-Shuffles (Cable)CARDs, COMMLAwBLOG (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.co mmlawblog.com/2010/10/articles/broadcast/fcc-reshuffles-CableCARDs.
28. Nate Anderson, FCC Admits CableCARD a Failure, Vows to Try Something Else,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/12/fcc-admits-
CableCARD-a-failure-vows-to-try-something-else.
29. Eric Bangeman, Lackluster CableCARD Adoption: Who's to Blame?, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 29, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2007/03/lackluster-
CableCARD-adoption-whos-to-blame.
30. Id.
31. Paul Glist & Paul B. Hudson, FCC Grants Charter Waiver of Set-Top Box
Integration Ban for Downloadable Security, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP (Apr. 19, 2013),
http://www.dwt.com/fcc-grants-charter-waiver-of-set-top-box-integration-ban-for-downloa
dable-security-04-19-2013/.
32. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 8557 (2007).
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solution. This "common reliance" was necessary to achieve the
broader goal of section 629: to allow consumers the option of
purchasing set-top boxes from sources other than their MVPD,
because the consumer would be guaranteed compatibility." But
several have criticized that the many waivers to such a ban weakened
any power the FCC may have had, and "evidence indicate[d] that many
retail device manufacturers abandoned CableC[ARD] before any
substantial benefits of the integration ban could be realized."
Despite the FCC's best efforts, many dubbed CableCARD a
failure. 5 The FCC itself stated, "[t]he Commission's CableCARD
rules have resulted in limited success in developing a retail market for
navigation devices. Certification for plug-and-play devices is costly
and complex."
C. Round 2: AllVid
After the "failure" of CableCARD, the FCC had to regroup and
find another way to satisfy its responsibilities under section 629. As
such, the FCC began to collect feedback on a new video interface to
replace the failed CableCARD device. This successor was dubbed
the "AllVid," an adapter that acted as an "intermediary" between
home theater equipment and pay-TV services." At its most basic
level, AllVid was a device similar to CableCARD; it allowed
consumers to plug into their digital television without the need of a
traditional cable box." AllVid hardware acted as a universal adapter
for all types of pay-TV content, including cable TV, satellite TV, and
internet TV."
The FCC's stated purpose in issuing the AllVid Notice of Inquiry
("NOI") was to gather information as to how this new technology
could possibly be their solution to the section 629 predicament:
33. Id. at 8560-61.
34. T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak & Michael Stern,
Wobbling Back to the Fire: Economic Efficiency and the Creation of a Retail Market for
Set-Top Boxes, 21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2010).
35. Anderson, supra note 28.
36. Public Notice, FCC, Comment Sought on Video Device Innovation: NBP Public
Notice #27, (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.fcc.gov/document/comment-sought-video-device-
innovation.
37. Matthew Lasar, Goodbye CableCARD, Hello "AllVid," ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 22,
2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/04/fcc-goodbye-CableCARD-hello-allvid.
38. Id.
39. Cable Asks FCC to Halt Plans for Connected TV Standard, BROADCAST
ENGINEERING (July 14, 2011), http://www.tvtechnology.com/multiformat/0112/cable-asks-
fcc-to-halt-plans-for-connected-tv-standard/256158.
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[T]he Commission seeks comment on specific steps we can
take to unleash competition in the retail market for smart, set-
top video devices .. . that are compatible with all multichannel
video programming distributor ("MVPD") services. Our goal
in this proceeding is to better effectuate the intent of Congress
as set forth in [s]ection 629 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended.4"
The NOI further elaborated that, as to the more specific goals, it
envisioned for the AllVid technology:
In particular, we wish to explore the potential for allowing any
electronics manufacturer to offer smart video devices at retail
that can be used with the services of any MVPD and without
the need to coordinate or negotiate with MVPDs. We believe
that this could foster a competitive retail market in smart
video devices to spur investment and innovation, increase
consumer choice, allow unfettered innovation in MVPD
delivery platforms, and encourage wider broadband use and
*41adoption ... .
The FCC additionally elaborated on how AllVid would be an
improvement over the failed CableCARD:
Unlike the existing cable-centric CableCARD technology, this
adapter could make possible the development and marketing
of smart video devices that attach to any MVPD service
anywhere in the United States, which could greatly enhance
the incentives for manufacturers to enter the retail
market .... We predict that smart video devices built to new
standards that would be adopted through this proceeding
would eventually replace CableCARD devices on retail
shelves.42
It appeared that the FCC had learned some lessons from its
failure with CableCARD, and was now trying to gather information
as to how to not repeat such errors and finally have a solution to
quench the section 629 mandates. Many players in the
telecommunications industry were very excited about the proposed
40. In re of Video Device Competition, 25 FCC Rcd. 4275 (2010).
41. Id. at 4275.
42. Id.
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AllVid technology and praised many of its stated goals. In particular,
a group of several of the top electronics and internet companies
including Google, Sony Electronics, TVO, Best Buy, and Mitsubishi
Digital Electronics banded together and created the "AllVid Tech
Company Alliance" ("AVTCA") which established a unified voice
for all consumer electronics companies to support the FCC's attempt
to find a solution that would supersede the CableCARD technology.43
AVTCA stood for the proposition that as society moved into an
all-digital and internet protocol ("IP")-delivery era," the FCC would
need to identify a secure, open, standard IP-based interface between
MVPD services and retail devices.45 Without the open standard of
AllVid, the telecommunications industry would essentially remain in
the same state, as frozen as it was when Congress enacted section 629
in 1996.46 AllVid would instead allow the FCC to move the industry
forward, leading to greater competition in the set-top box sales
industry, and greater consumer choice.47 In particular, AllVid would
develop a competitive market for set-top navigation devices based on
an IP interface, which consumers could use to choose the technology
best tailored to their preferences (instead of letting the MPVDs make
such decisions for them)." The consumer would never again have to be
concerned with issues such as how to port or store their content on TV,
computer, video game, or mobile platforms; and the consumer would
not have to be concerned with the loss of such content if they chose to
switch MPVDs.49 Further, the fact that consumers would have more
freedom of choice, which would in turn allow them to more seamlessly
switch providers, would spark a response from the MPVDs to further
innovation and satisfy their customers' needs to keep them as
subscribers.o
Conversely, many other players in the telecommunications
market, such as many MVPDs and the National Cable &
Telecommunications Association ("NCTA"), believed that AllVid
43. Brent Evans, AllVid Alliance Formed; TiVo & Google on Board, "Zatz Not
Funny!" (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.zatznotfunny.com/2011-02/allvid-alliance-formed-tivo-
google-on-board.
44. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 5212 (2013).
45. Id. at 5216-17.




50. Letter from AllVid Tech Company Alliance, to Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman
(Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021029645.
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was not a viable solution, and that the market was functioning fine
without such regulations. The NCTA argued that the state of
technology at the time of the AllVid NOI was very different than
anything that Congress could have envisioned when drafting section
629." When section 629 was drafted, DBS was in its infancy,
telephone companies were not permitted to enter the MVPD field,
and broadband was nonexistent.52 As such, section 629 was designed
to promote consumer choice, which at that time was constrained
because of those factors. Over the fifteen-year period since section
629 was introduced, those factors were replaced by more competition
in the MVPD market with the entrance of telephone providers, and a
variety of internet based programming and devices:"
[N]ot a day goes by without the announcement of new video
device choices for consumers to access video content-from
the Internet, from their MVPD or from other sources. In
1996, when [s]ection 629 was adopted, its authors could hardly
have imagined the world of today with DBS and telco TV
providers competing with traditional cable operators, with
Internet connected TVs expected to top 118 million in a few
short years, with smart video devices like Roku, Google TV,
and Vudu, video services from Netflix, YouTube and Hulu,
game consoles from Microsoft, Nintendo and Sony providing
video content[.]54
This view followed the assumption that there was no need for
Congress and the FCC to promote section 629 at all because the
advances in technology would solve the problem of competition in the
market place organically on its own. Those opposed to the AllVid
technology went as far as believing that imposing technology mandates
in such a dynamic marketplace would in fact suppress innovation and
consequently rob consumers of novel products and services." Moreover,
many who opposed the AllVid regulations argued that the majority of
51. CABLE SUPPORTS THE FCC'S VIDEO DEVICE GOALS BUT WARNS AGAINST
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consumers preferred to lease their set-top boxes from MVPDs." The
opponents opined that consumers did not favor having to pay money
upfront for the set-top equipment or having to make extra trips to
retailers to purchase the boxes. There was an aditional fear that, with
the rapid growth in the technology market, consumers would be stuck
with owning outdated technology." Partly for these reasons, the AllVid
opposition recommended that the FCC invoke section 629's sunset
provision, which calls for the FCC to abandon trying to regulate set-top
boxes when the market became effectively competitive. 9
D. Where is AllVid Now?
When the FCC introduced the NOI for AllVid, it was a hot topic
that was greatly debated in the communications industry. But just as
quickly as it climbed to fame, the NOI just as swiftly disappeared.
Some believe that AllVid is currently orphaned while the
technology community awaits a new FCC chairman. When Julius
Genachowski announced in March 2013 that he was stepping down as
FCC Commissioner he left many issues unresolved, including the
status of AllVid.' Critics of his tenure believe that Genachowski had
missed many opportunities during his time as Chairman, and his
replacement would be left to grapple with many difficult technology
issues." One of the tasks waiting for the new Chairman will be
reevaluating the status and/or relevance of AllVid and section 629.
Many of the AllVid opposers argue that AllVid may not be
necessary because of the emergence of MVPD's downloadable
"apps" on devices like Apple's iPad, the particular internet-connected
televisions sets or cable systems,62 or the fact that cloud-based
programming guides and user interfaces are becoming
commonplace." One could deduce that the FCC is possibly taking a
56. Seth L. Cooper, FCC's "AllVid" Regulation of Video Devices All Wrong, THE





60. Brandon Bailey, FCC Chair Steps Down, Leaves Some Thorny Tech Issues for
Successor, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013), available at http://www.mercury
news.com/business/ci_22851384/fcc-chair-steps-down-leaves-some-thomy-tech.
61. Id.
62. Todd Spangler, AllVid Alliance: "Shiny" Apps Aren't Replacement for Open
Video Standard, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (July 11, 2011), http://www.multichannel.com/
content/allvid-alliance-shiny-apps-arent-replacement-open-video-standard.
63. Cable Asks FCC to Halt Plans for Connected TV Standard, supra note 39.
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step back and watching to see if these markets are truly satisfying the
competition standards mandated by section 629 before taking any
further action.
Conversely, Genachowski stated that "[t]here's no question that
in the last one to two years, there's been innovation in the space.
That's a good thing and that's relevant." While acknowledging the
fact that these technological advances have been growing
exponentially greater in the past couple years than compared to the
past decade, Genachowski still holds strong on the position that the
FCC would continue to "take steps to spur innovation in and around
the TV platform."6
E. A Further Hurdle-Echostar Satellite L.L. C. v. FCC
In Echostar65 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held
that the FCC lacked the statutory authority to restrict the use of so-
called "encoding" technologies that block consumers from recording
television programs." On January 15, 2013, the court held that the
FCC lacked authority to impose standards on satellite (or DBS)
providers.6 ' The court noted that although one of the named goals of
section 629 was "to increase the availability of satellite cable
programming and satellite broadcast programming" this goal had not
been achieved, but was instead inhibited.?
In Echostar DBS provider Dish Network challenged two orders of
the FCC "encoding rules," which limited the means of encoding that
cable and satellite service providers could employ to prevent
unauthorized access to their broadcasts.' The controversy
concerning these "encoding" rules originated in section 629, which
directed the FCC to "adopt regulations to assure the commercial
availability" of "equipment used by consumers to access [MVP]
services ... from [independent] manufacturers, retailers, and other
vendors."'o At the same time, the regulations could not "jeopardize
64. Ryan Lawler, FCC's Genachowski on Broadband, Retrans and TV Apps, GIGAOM
(June 15,2011,3:01 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/06/15/fcc-genachowski-cable-show.
65. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FFC, 704 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
66. Paul Barbagallo, Court Rejects FCC "Plug and Play" Rules, Says Agency Lacks
Authority, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.bna.com/court-rejects-fcc-nl71798
71870.
67. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FFC, 704 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
68. Id. at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. at 994 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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security of multichannel video programming ... or impede the legal
rights of a provider of such services to prevent theft of service.""
In 2002, with the encouragement of the FCC, cable TV service
providers began negotiations with representatives of the consumer
electronics industry to try and create an agreement as to uniform
standards across all cable systems. These standards were dubbed
"Plug-and-Play" because they would allow consumers to circumvent
external navigation devices and plug directly into their television
sets.72 These negotiations were followed in a Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU"), which decided on encoding standards that
were ideally going to strike a balance between opening up a third
party market while simultaneously allowing the cable companies to
encode the video content to deter theft.3 This agreement was
contingent on the application of the encoding rules to all MVPDs
(including DBS providers), not just cable television service providers.
As such, in January 2003 the FCC issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking, and solicited commentary on the MOU.' During the
comment period, several DBS providers found fault with the proposed
encoding rules applying to all MVPDs.76 In particular, the satellite
providers found disfavor firstly on the basis that they were not included
in the MOU's negotiations, and that the encoding rules applyed to all
MPVDs as a quid pro quo for cable service providers' acquiescence to
plug-and-play standards."77
Despite the DBSs providers' challenges, the FCC nonetheless
adopted the proposed rules with minor changes, justifying their
actions with the rationale that competitive imbalance absent universal
adoption warranted overlooking the satellite providers' objections.
Plaintiff Dish brought suit challenging the FCC's adoption of such
"encoding" rules on the basis that applying these rules to all MPVDs
(including DBS providers) exceeded the FCC's statutory authority,
thus the FCC lacked the power to impose such rules on Dish.79 The
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 995; see also William Peacock, DISH Network: Unlike Warren G, the FCC
Can't Regulate Us, FINDLAW (Jan. 18, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/dccircuit/
2013/01/dish-network-unlike-warren-g-the-fcc-cant-regulate-us.html.




78. Id. at 996.
79. Id. at 996.
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FCC argued three different sources for its authority to adopt the
"encoding" regulations." First, the language of section 629 provided
that the FCC could "adopt regulations to assure the commercial
availability ... of converter boxes . . . ."" Second, section 624A
authorized the FCC "to restrict cable systems in a manner in which
they encrypt or scramble signals" to ensure compatibility between TV
and VCR and cable systems.8 Lastly, the FCC had ancillary authority
under both section 629 and section 624A.83
WI.Ancillary Jurisdiction and the FCC: How Far is to Far?
The court in Echostar focused its analysis and its holding on the
question of whether the "encoding" rules were reasonably ancillary to
the FCC's effective execution of its duties under either section 629 or
section 624A." To truly understand the court's reasoning, and how
the outcome of Echostar will affect the fate of section 629 and other
pending cases in the DC Circuit, one must first understand in what
way the FCC gained its power of ancillary jurisdiction, and the reach
of such authority.
Under Title II of the Telecommunications Act, the FCC was granted
authority to regulate common carrier telecommunications by wire, and
under Title III of the same Act to regulate broadcasting over the air.'
This left a question as to if the FCC possessed authority to control the
delivery of television signals over wires. The FCC initially determined
that it in fact did not have authority to regulate television signals
transmitted over cable, but later reconsidered this stance and expressed
its power to regulate cable under what would become known as "Title I
authority."" "Title I authority" endowed this regulatory power on the
FCC because such regulations were ancillary to its mission to regulate
broadcasting.' In essence, "Title I authority" gave the FCC a common
law-like ability to have the power to cultivate new rules for developing
technologies." Title I states that the FCC has power "[flor the purpose
of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire
80. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FFC, 704 F.3d 992,996-97 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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and radio" and that it applies to, "among other things," all interstate and
foreign communication by wire or radio." Additionally, section 4(i) of
the Act, referred to as the "necessary and proper" clause, permits the
FCC to "perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and
issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary
in the execution of its functions.""
United States v. Southwest Cable Co., the first case to deal with the
issue of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction, involved a defendant's
unauthorized importation of a Los Angeles-based over-the-air
television signal into the San Diego area.1 This importation was seen
as inconsistent with the public interest, and adversely affected cable
stations in the San Diego area by fragmenting the San Diego
audience." Consequently, this fragmentation had the effect of
reducing advertising revenues for the local San Diego broadcasters.93
To remedy this dilemma, the FCC established regulations over
community antenna TV (otherwise known as "CATV," an early form
of cable television), which was challenged under the theory that the
FCC lacked authority under the Communications Act to such
regulations. 94  The Court indeed found that under certain
circumstances, the FCC has powers to regulate CATV:
It is enough to emphasize that the authority which we recognize
today under 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. The
Commission may, for these purposes, "issue such rules and
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not
inconsistent with law," as "public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires."
Southwest stands for the proposition that the FCC does have the
power to regulate issues that are "reasonably ancillary" to the
performance of its responsibilities." But this decision left many
questions as to what is within the scope of "reasonably ancillary."
89. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996); 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1996).
90. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).
91. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
92. Id. at 160.
93. Id. at 160 n.4.
94. Id. at 161.
95. Id. at 178.
96. Id.
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Four years later, the court once again supported the FCC's
ancillary jurisdiction in United States v. Midwest Video Corporation
("Midwest I")." The Court held that the FCC had the authority to
issue to implement a regulation of a regulation that required cable
operators to facilitate the creation of new programs and to transmit
them alongside broadcast programs they captured over the air.98 The
court justified the ancillary jurisdiction as being proper because the
FCC substantially presented that the regulation would promote the
public interest." the Court noted that the regulation "preserves and
enhances the integrity of broadcast signals and therefore is
'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting.'""m Midwest I stands for the proposition that the FCC's
ancillary jurisdiction was indeed justified in Southwestern, and could
be somewhat extended.
FCC v. Midwest Video Corporation ("Midwest II") further
clarified the reach of the FCC ancillary jurisdiction.'1 In 1976, the
FCC proclaimed rules for cable television systems that have 3,500 or
more subscribers and carry broadcast signals. These systems were
required to develop at least a twenty-channel capacity (by 1986) to
make available certain channels for public, educational, local
government, leased access users, and equip such users with facilities
and equipment enabling them to broadcast.10
The affected cable television systems argued that they were being
deprived of all discretion regarding who could exploit their access
channels and what content would be transmitted over these
channels.'03 The Court grappled with the question of whether these
rules were "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting."" The Court held that the FCC regulates cable
systems as common carriers, and may not impose such obligations on
television broadcasters, without a specific mandate from Congress,
As such the decisions were not within the FCC's statutory authority,
97. United States v. Midwest Video Corp. ("Midwest 1"), 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
98. Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
99. Midwest 1, 406 U.S. at 647.
100. Id. at 670.
101. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. ("Midwest II"), 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
102. Id. at 691.
103. Id. at 639.
104. Id. at 692.
105. Id. at 708.
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or its ancillary jurisdiction.'" The court reasoned that the FCC was
not delegated unrestrained authority.'w The FCC's authority at issue
in Southwestern was consistent with the Telecommunications Act
because such regulations were crucial to prevent interference with the
FCC's work in the broadcasting area, but here in Midwest II "they
overlook[ed] the fact that Congress has restricted the Commission's
ability to advance objectives associated with public access at the
expense of the journalistic freedom of persons engaged in
broadcasting."" Midwest II affirms the validity of the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction, while pointing out that the FCC's power is not
unfettered, and draws a line as to one point where the FCC's ancillary
reach ends.
The extent of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction was further clarified
in FCC v. American Library Association ("American Library").06
American Library dealt with events related to the United States'
transition from analog to digital television. The FCC, concerned with
establishing rules to prevent the unauthorized copying and
redistribution of digital television programs, enacted "broadcast flag"
regulations.' The broadcast flag regulations required that digital
television receivers and other devices capable of receiving digital
television broadcasts, manufactured on or after July 1, 2005, include
technology permitting them to recognize the "broadcast flag" (a
digital code implanted in a DTV broadcasting stream, which prevents
digital television reception equipment from redistributing broadcast
content).il
Based on this set of facts, the American Library court recognized
that the FCC may only exercise ancillary jurisdiction when two
conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission's general jurisdictional
grant under Title I covers the regulated subject, and (2) the
regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.112
In applying the "broadcast flag" facts to this test, the Court found
that Title I did not authorize the FCC to regulate a receiver apparatus
after a transmission was complete (a "broadcast flag" affects receiver
devices only after a broadcast transmission is complete), and as such
106. Id. at 708-09.
107. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. ("Midwest II"), 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979).
108. Id. at 706-07.
109. FCC v. Am. Library Ass'n, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
110. Id. at 694.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 692.
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the FCC acted beyond the scope of the authority that had been
delegated to it by Congress."' American Library once again
demonstrated that, for the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction to be proper,
there must be some connection to the power delegated to them by
Congress. The case clearly presented a test to apply when the FCC's
ancillary jurisdiction is at issue.
A further illustration of the "outer limits" of the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction is provided in Comcast v. FCC."4 Comcast contemplated
whether the FCC had authority to regulate an internet service
provider's network management practices."' In particular, several
subscribers to Comcast's high-speed internet service noticed that
Comcast was interfering with their peer-to-peer applications."' As
such, many groups filed complaints with the FCC (including law
professors and public interest groups). Eventually these groups came
together and filed a petition for a declaratory ruling on the theory
that Comcast's actions "violated the FCC's Internet Policy
Statement.,"'
Applying the two-part test from American Library, the Comcast
court found that the FCC could not satisfy the second requirement of
such test (the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities)."' In particular, the court found that the FCC was
basing its ancillary authority upon only policy statements expressed
by Congress and not upon actually expressed authority."' The court
explained that "policy statements are just that-statements of policy.
They are not delegations of regulatory authority." 20 The court held
that because the FCC failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority
over Comcast's internet service to any "statutorily mandated
responsibility," it could not exercise power over Comcast's network
management practices. 2'
Southwest, Midwest I, Midwest II, American Library, and Comcast
illustrate the narrow and winding road from which the FCC's
ancillary jurisdiction has emerged and its current ambiguity in the
113. Id.
114. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
115. Id at 644.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 647.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642,654 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
121. Id. at 661.
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courts. This understanding is essential to comprehend the court's
analysis and holding in Echostar, and how its interpretation of the
FCC's ancillary jurisdictional power will affect the future of section
629.
A. EchoStar: A Fatal Blow to the FCC's Ancillary Power?
The EchoStar court majority found that the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction under section 629 indeed did not provide any authority
for the FCC to regulate the encoding rules as to DBS providers.122
The court began its analysis by pointing out that section 629
provided no direct authority for the enforcement of the encoding
rules. Judge Brown explains:
Thou section 629's directive to "adopt regulations to assure
the commercial availability" of navigation devices may afford
the FCC some wiggle room in crafting its regulatory regime,
the statute's language is not as capacious as the agency
suggests .... Certainly, section 629 provides no explicit
textual basis for the encoding rules, instead authorizing
"regulations to assure the commercial availability" of
navigation devices. But the FCC points out the encoding rules
fulfill "consumers' expectations that their digital televisions
and other equipment will work to the full capabilities" ....
Consumer satisfaction enhances consumer demand, ensuring a
viable commercial market. However, as the FCC
acknowledges, the encoding rules are not necessary to sustain
a commercial market for direct broadcast satellite devices."
Judge Brown and the majority of the court were not convinced that
"consumer satisfaction" in the present commercial market for satellite
broadcasters was a realistic concern. This is because the FCC has long
been treating satellites as already supporting a commercial market in
retail set-top boxes. Satellite support for a retail set-top market has
long changed since the inception of section 629, but these
advancements have not yet been codified in FCC rules.'24 The court
122. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id.; see also Paul Glist, D.C Circuit Vacates Plug and Play Order and Encoding
Rules Applicable to Multichannel Video Programming Distributors, DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE LLP (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/DC-Circuit-Vacates-Plug-and-Play-
Order-and-Encoding-Rules-Applicable-to-Multichannel-Video-Programming-Distributors
-01-16-2013/.
2014]1 FCC AND ANCILLARY POWER 329
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
further explained, ". . . as the order itself recognizes, and satellite
equipment is 'already available at retail' and 'portable
nationwide[]'... [a]pplying the encoding rules to cable providers may
meet consumer expectations with respect to the market for cable
devices, but that is no reason to impose these rules on all MVPDs."125
Alternatively, the FCC argued that the encoding rules "are [an]
essential component of the MOU" and that the MOU "will assure the
commercial availability of navigation devices." 26 This argument was
also not convincing to the court. Judge Brown explained that if the
court were to find support in section 629 for the encoding rules in this
fashion, that this would allow the FCC to impose any regulation they
choose by simply stipulating the regulation in an MOU with the
justification of promoting "commercial availability."127 Judge Brown
further explained that to interpret section 629 in this manor "would
leave the FCC's regulatory power unbridled" as long as the FCC
claims to be working towards making navigation devices
commercially available."' This sort of "plenary power" was
interpreted by the court to be beyond the scope of section 629's
ancillary power granted by Congress.
The court next discussed the FCC's proposition that jurisdiction
was proper under both sections 629 and 624A because under certain
conditions, the FCC's regulatory power extends beyond its express
authority.29 For example, the rule of Southwest is satisfied if the
commission "perform[s] any and all acts, make[s] such rules and
regulation, and issue[s] such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter,
as may be necessary in the execution of its functions. "
The EchoStar court applied the test prescribed in American
Library to decide if the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction was indeed
justified."' Once again, just as in Comcast, the second part of the test
(whether the encoding rules were reasonably ancillary to the FCC's
effective execution of its duties) was at issue.'32 The Court rejected the
FCC's contention that the encoding rules satisfy the second prong of
the American Library test because the regulations assure the
commercial availability of navigation devices, as they removed one of




129. Id. at 998.
130. Id. at 998 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2012)).
131. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
132. Id.
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the "stumbling blocks" to the consumer electronics industry's
production of such equipment for retail, specifically the "inability of
industry to agree on a comprehensive set of technical copy protection
measures and corresponding encoding rules" that would "ensure the
availability of high value content to consumers in a protected digital
environment. "' The court was hesitant to accept such an
interpretation again on the supposition that such a standard would
leave little that the "FCC could not regulate in the name of fulfilling
[section] 629's mandate."" The interpretation also suggests that the
FCC's ancillary jurisdiction to effectively be "plenary," and therefore
the Court decided that the FCC's power should not be treated as
"unrestrained authority."135 The court further clarified that it refused
to interpret the FCC's ancillary power as a "proxy for omnibus powers
limited only by the FCC's creative linking its regulatory actions to the
goal of commercial availability of navigation devices."136
Despite the majority's seemingly unfettered conclusion that the
FCC had reached well beyond its ancillary power, Judge Edwards in
his concurring opinion seemed to take a less definitive view. Judge
Edwards agreed that the encoding rules should be vacated, but
nonetheless believes that the FCC does have some authority under
section 629 to possibly enact rules on DBS providers:37
Congress obviously afforded the FCC considerable discretion
in directing the agency to promulgate standards "to assure the
commercial availability ... of converter boxes, interactive
communications equipment, and other equipment used by
consumers to access multichannel video programming and
other services offered over multichannel video programming
systems, from manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors not
affiliated with any multichannel video programming
distributor.... The statute does not by its terms prohibit the
requirement of encoding rules. Rather, any challenge to the
agency's exercise of its discretion under [s]ection 629 must
take into account the circumstances presented and the
Commission's explanation for the action in question.'




137. Barbagallo, supra note 66.
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The Echostar court recognized that the FCC's ancillary power is
"broad, but it is not unbounded,"'39 and as such rejected the text of §
629 having no direct authority for the FCC to enforce any encoding
rules on DBS providers, and is further unimpressed with section 624A
providing justification for the FCC's mandates, because although it
addresses encoding, it does so only in the context of cable systems.4 0
But all may not be lost for the FCC if the view of Judge Edwards
in his concurrence is given deference. Echostar seems to stand for the
proposition that the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction cannot be extended
to cover a situation by simply saying the magic words "commercial
availability of navigation devices." Moreover, although the majority
may be correct that the FCC went too far in this situation, the
concurrence may also be correct to not foreclose all possibilities of
jurisdiction over DBS providers concerning encoding regulations.
B. Echostar The Aftermath
The outcome of Echostar could have repercussions that may
reach many facets of the communications industry. In particular, the
FCC has based many of its expansive new regulatory controls over
information technologies and services squarely on its ancillary
jurisdiction power. 4 ' One such pending case in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is Verizon v. FCC, which considers the
issue of whether the FCC has statutory authority under section 706
and Title III of the Telecommunications Act to regulate broadband
internet access services, and the extent to which such regulation
constitutes prohibited common-carrier regulation.'43 Section 706 in
pertinent part states that the FCC "shall encourage the deployment
on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced communications
capability." Section 706 further authorizes the FCC to take steps to
stimulate build-out of telecommunications infrastructure, especially
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Seth L. Cooper, A Recent Appeals Court Ruling on Ancillary Power Limits Could
Curb Regulatory Overreach, FREE STATE FOUNDATION (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.freestate
foundation.org/images/A Recent_AppealsCourtRulingonAncillaryLPower_LimitsCould
_CurbRegulatoryOverreach_021113.pdf [hereinafter Cooper, Recent Appeals Court
Ruling].
142. Brief for Petitioner, Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 11-
1355 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2012), 2012 WL 9937411.
143. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 142, at *2.
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in order to increase the reach of telecommunications services to more
Americans."
Verizon argues that the FCC has no basis for asserting ancillary
power over broadband providers, and further contends that the FCC
has not shown that the rules are necessary to achieve any statutorily
mandated task.145 Verizon additionally contends that the FCC does not
identify which (if any) provisions support the exercise of ancillary
authority.'" Furthermore, Verizon cites Comcast as expressing that the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
already made clear that "rate regulation" of internet services would
exceed the "outer boundaries" of the FCC's ancillary authority.
Verizon also argues that Comcast further made clear that the FCC may
not claim "plenary authority over" broadband providers.47
Verizon further contends that the FCC asserts authority to
regulate broadband providers based upon nothing other than the
agency's notions of "economic and civic benefits" associated with the
Internet." If found to be a valid anchor for ancillary jurisdiction,
those "benefits" could allow the FCC to capture jurisdiction not just
to broadband service, "but to all aspects of a broadband provider's
business, including specialized services and even retail customer
prices."19 Verizon interprets the FCC's justifications for ancillary
jurisdiction to have the practical outcome that, if accepted, "would
virtually free the Commission from its congressional tether," and such
acceptance would risk ratifying a naked, unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority.5 o
Verizon further discusses section 706(a) in particular as to the
FCC's possibility of ancillary jurisdiction:
Finally, just as with the preceding items, the Commission must
rely on an independent source of authority to invoke the
catch-all phrase covering any other regulating methods that
remove barriers to investment ..... [S]ection 706(a) does not
constitute an independent grant of forbearance authority or of
144. Part I: FCC "Ancillary" Authority to Regulate the Internet? Don't Count on It,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 3, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/
02/part-i-fcc-ancillary-authority-regulate-internet.
145. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 142, at *22.
146. Id. at *23.
147. Id. at *26.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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authority to employ other regulating methods." This clause,
standing alone, does not grant the FCC any authority to adopt
new rules (much less unfettered authority for ones that do not
"'remove" a "barrier" to infrastructure investment but instead
undermine it). Thus, the Order's reliance on [s]ection 706(a)
begs the question of which underlying authority permits these
rules.'
Verizon may have a strong case as to the lack of ancillary
jurisdiction for the FCC if the court once again follows its logic in
Comcast. Verizon must argue that the FCC has again failed to tie its
assertion of ancillary authority to any statutorily mandated
responsibility. The FCC asserted that its jurisdictional authority is
proper as to broadband network management because it "constitutes
communication by wire or radio" and is therefore subject matter
under Title I of the Telecommunications Act.'52 The FCC's theory
essentially follows that because broadband internet services like
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VOIP") and online video delivery are
becoming substitutions for traditional telephony, MVPD services, and
local broadcast television, the FCC can expand its jurisdiction to draw
in broadband networks that provide these newer internet-based
choices.153
This FCC interpretation could be at odds with the Echostar
holding in that the Echostar court was concerned with the FCC
having "effectively plenary" or "unbounded" power over their
ancillary jurisdiction as long as they could envision any sort of
"creative linking" of its regulatory actions to the goal of commercial
availability of navigation devices.'" If the court in Verizon allows the
FCCs ancillary jurisdiction to stand based on the premise that the
Internet is just a newer technological version of the old devices it has
control over, this could indeed open the flood gates for the FCC's
jurisdictional power to be within reach for anything internet related
that resembles telephony, MVPD services, or local broadcast
television. The FCC's argument could be interpreted as beyond the
scope of their ancillary jurisdiction if the court follows Echostar's
holding, which feared "plenary power."
151. Id. at *30 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Cooper, Recent Appeals Court Ruling, supra note 141, at 5.
153. Id.
154. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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The FCC further argues that its ancillary jurisdiction is proper
under section 706 as Congress has requested that the Commission
"encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans" through
"price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote
competition in the local telecommunications market, or other
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment.""' This notwithstanding, the Verizon court could
realistically follow the reasoning of the Echostar court and once again
"refuse to interpret ancillary authority as a proxy for omnibus powers
limited only by the FCC's creativity in linking its regulatory actions to
the goal" of encouraging deployment of advanced communications
services such as broadband."'
The holding in Echostar, which seemingly narrows the
Commissions ability to adhere proper ancillary jurisdiction over DBS
providers in conjunction with encoding rules, could be a genuine
stumbling block for the FCC if the Verizon court translates this fear
of the FCC gaining "plenary power" as just as relevant to the
Commission forcing regulations on Broadband providers.
A further repercussion stemming from the Echostar holding may
be a damaging blow to the FCC's legal basis for the AllVid
technology. The Echostar holding may be interpreted as adverse to
the FCC's jurisdictional power to extend regulations over all MVPD
providers.'5 The holding from Echostar might imply that the FCC's
certainty as to its ancillary jurisdictional power to impose extensive
new regulations may be improper for set-top television devices. While
section 629 burdens the FCC to "ensure the commercial availability
of third-party retail devices for the retail market" concerning
MVPD's, it does not suggest that the FCC set basic design parameters
for in what way those devices function and/or interact. Further,
section 629 does not impose uniform standards regarding protocols or
codecs such set-top boxes would use. More specifically, section 629
nowhere requires the FCC to force MVPDs to unbundle their
services and thus make their video guide content separately available
to third-party device manufacturers to repackage and redisplay to
MVPD subscribers.58  These sweeping regulations could be
interpreted by a court to be far outside the scope of the Congressional
155. Cooper, Recent Appeals Court Ruling, supra note 141, at 6.
156. Id. at 4.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id. at 7.
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mandate to "ensure the commercial availability of third-party retail
devices for the retail market." The Echostar court's fear of endowing
the FCC with the power of "creativity in linking its regulatory actions
to the goal of commercial availability of navigation devices" could
surely be interpreted as the FCC trying not only to foster a market for
AllVid, but additionally forcing basic design parameters on MPVD
providers in their adoption of the AllVid technology.'
IV.Conclusion
The FCC, in its quest to fulfill its congressionally-mandated task
to "adopt regulations to assure the commercial availability, to
consumers of equipment used to access multichannel video
programming and other services offered over multichannel video
programming systems"'6 has travelled down a long and complicated
path. When Congress enlisted the FCC to achieve such measures,
modern technologies such as the Internet were in their infancy, and
surely not a realistic concern for Congress. As such, the FCC through
its ancillary jurisdiction has valiantly fought to secure jurisdiction
over such new technologies with mixed results.
The recent holding in Echostar is just one of many in a long chain
of decisions which have slowly been molding the outer boundaries of
the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction. The Echostar holding may be
interpreted as a final straw for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit as to their fear of the FCC using such ancillary power as a
means to gaining jurisdiction in a plenary manor. Conversely, one
could interpret the Echostar holding as a small setback for the FCC
that will be correctly interpreted by the Verizon court, thus
reinstating the FCC with a larger jurisdictional reach. Moreover, If
the Verizon court gives deference to the holding in Echostar, it may
be seen as the end of the FCC's ability to truly create and enforce a
realistic solution to the section 629 issue, and place any power the
FCC may have had over broadband providers in jeopardy.
Many solutions have been presented as to what the FCC's options
are to brandish some power over broadband providers (including
reclassifying broadband as a telecommunications service under Title
II of the Telecommunications Act, or lobbying Congress to codify
159. Id.
160. 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1996).
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such power),"' but the extent to which the FCC will need to reinvent
itself to gain such authority may not be known until the Verizon
holding is handed down, and the true impact of Echostar is
determined.
Editor's Note: The Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission
case discussed in Part III. B. was decided on January 14, 2014 and cited
as 740 E3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). This decision might affect the law but
does not affect the argument and validity of this article.
161. How to Lobby Your Elected Officials on Net Neutrality, Reclassification and
Internet Freedom, FREEPRESS ACTION FUND, http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/
resources/how to lobbyjreclass.pdf.
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